This paper considers whether an equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy can be inferred from summary measures of reranking. It is conjectured that, if the government has a distributional objective and formulates tax policy with a view to equitable treatment of income units, then adopting the scale that is implicit in government transfer policy should only identify reranking that has no equity foundation. This motivates the question: Is the incidence of reranking associated with a transfer system minimised by the equivalence scale that is implicit in the transfer system? The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the equivalence scale which minimises reranking, while not necessarily equal to the closest approximation to the one that is implicit in transfer policy, is nevertheless in its vicinity.
Introduction
The use of adult equivalent scales, to allow for non-income-relevant di¤erences between income units, is widespread in the empirical analysis of inequality. A wide variety of scales exists and it is known that they can have substantial effects on income distribution comparisons; see Coulter et al. (1992b) . While it is recognised that the choice of scales involves value judgements, surprisingly little attention has been given to the question of the value judgements implicit in the tax and transfer system. The aim of this paper is to examine whether information about such judgements can be obtained from the analysis of changes in the rank order of pre-tax incomes compared with that of the post-tax distribution.
Survey data usually reveal that the rank order of income units is altered after taxes and bene…ts are added to gross income, an e¤ect that is commonly referred to as reranking. One explanation for reranking is that the order based on income gross of taxes and bene…ts (hereafter referred to as pre-tax income) is 'unfair' because it fails to take into consideration the di¤ering needs of a heterogeneous population. Most transfer systems adjust for household need by basing tax and bene…ts payments on the number, age and health status of household members, and these adjustments can a¤ect the post-tax order of households. However, it is unlikely that all rank reversals are attributable to an unfair distribution of pre-tax income. 1 Reranking can also arise as the result of government policy that is tangential to equity objectives. For example, unemployment bene…ts may be designed to encourage labour market participation, or certain types of income may be treated di¤erently on e¢ciency grounds. Any reranking that arises as a result of these non-equity based considerations is an issue of concern for studies that consider the redistributive e¤ects of taxation. This is because such reranking opposes the extent to which a transfer system reduces inequality of pre-tax incomes, and thus contradicts a progressivity objective.
Adult equivalent incomes are commonly used to focus on reranking that is perceived as having no equity justi…cation (hereafter referred to as inequitable reranking).
2 This methodology requires the selection of an equivalence scale that is used to adjust incomes for di¤erences in unit need. Despite a considerable research e¤ort, however, no compelling criteria have been identi…ed for selecting an equivalence scale. This problem is important for applied studies of reranking because observed reranking typically depends upon the equivalence scale adopted. Hence applied studies of reranking are commonly criticised for failing to di¤erentiate between reranking that is attributable to assumed value judgements, and reranking that arises due to inequities of the tax and bene…ts system. 3
The question considered here is whether it is possible to infer a set of equivalence scales that are implicit in tax and bene…ts policy, by identifying the equivalence scale speci…cation that minimises observed reranking. 4 Unlike estimation methods that have been suggested elsewhere 5 , this approach does not depend on an assumed tax function for reference units. It is based on the premise that, if the government has a distributional objective and formulates tax policy with a view to equitable treatment of income units, then adopting a scale that is implicit in government transfer policy should identify only inequitable reranking.
The conjecture that there exists a single equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy warrants some comment. Speci…cally, it is frequently assumed that the adjustments made by …scal policy for household heterogeneity describe a range of equivalence scales, rather than a single set of relativities. 6 It is possible, however, to show that the equivalence scale framework is su¢ciently ‡exible to describe any redistributive system (see, for example, Muellbauer and van de Ven, 2003) . 7 In this paper we follow the methodology of Muellbauer and van de Ven (2003) , and de…ne the equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy as the scale that minimises horizontal inequity. 8 and Ramos (1997a, b), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) , Aronson et al. (1994), and Jenkins (1988a) . 3 On the scepticism that is associated with measures of reranking due to the equivalence scales assumed, see Lambert (2003, footnote 2) . 4 This suggestion was also mentioned brie ‡y in Creedy and van de Ven (2001) . A related issue concerns the aversion to inequality. Attempts to impute a value of inequality aversion implicit in government tax decisions include Christiansen and Jansen (1978) and Stern (1977) ; see also Mera (1969) , Moreh (1981) and Brent (1984) .
5 See, for example, Muellbauer and van de Ven (2003) . 6 See, for example, Coulter et al. (1992a) . 7 See also Seneca and Taussig (1971) . 8 Horizontal equity requires 'equal treatment of equals'. This is de…ned by Muellbauer and van de Ven (2003) as the requirement that households with the same pre-tax equivalent
The issue of how reranking should be interpreted is discussed at greater length in Section 2. This discussion is extended in Section 3, where a formal model is used to identify the factors that determine the incidence of reranking.
Section 4 considers whether the reranking observed for a transfer system is indeed minimised by the equivalence scale that is implicit in the transfer system. It is argued, based on a hypothetical population comprised of two income unit types, that reranking need not be minimised by the equivalence scale that is implicit in tax and bene…ts policy. It is, however, conjectured that, in practice, the scale that minimises reranking is likely to be closely related to the scale that implicitly underlies transfer policy. To test this conjecture, survey data are considered in Section 5.
Previous work on the role of equivalence scales in distributional analyses has focused on inequality and poverty measurement.
9 A study that has examined the impact of equivalence scales on observed reranking is by Nolan (1987) . He expressed surprise on …nding that adult equivalent income showed more reranking than unadjusted incomes. 1 0 The observations based on survey data that are presented in Section 5 suggest that Nolan's …ndings (which appear to contradict the idea that an implicit equivalence scale can be identi…ed by minimising observed reranking) are attributable to the focus of the equivalence scale that he used. Conclusions are in Section 6.
Interpretations of Reranking
The appropriate interpretation of reranking depends on the importance that is assigned to the rank order of pre-tax incomes, which is re ‡ected in alternative views regarding distributive justice. 11 In the absence of a widely accepted principle of redistributive justice, some guidance may be obtained by relating reranking to horizontal equity, which was described by Musgrave (1959, p.160) as 'perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation'. The relation between reranking and horizontal equity is de…ned here with the use of a incomes should have the same post-tax equivalent incomes. 9 See, for example, Buhmann et al. (1988) , Coulter et al. (1992a, b) , and Banks and Johnson (1994) .
1 0 Nolan's use of scales based on Supplementary Bene…t rates followed the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth.
1 1 For example, with a Rawlsian view involving a maximin strategy, emphasis is on the minimum income level and no signi…cance is attached to the rank order of incomes. i for a population, the government is considered to impose an 'equivalised tax function', T (x ¤ i ), so that:
where " i allows for the possibility of horizontal inequity, and assume that
This restriction prohibits an explicit reranking objective of government in terms of adult equivalent incomes: it was formulated by Feldstein (1976) , and adopted by Kakwani and Lambert (1998) as one of their three axioms of equity in taxation.
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Add to this framework the following three assumptions. First, the population is su¢ciently large such that there are several individuals with the same pre-tax income as any other individual. Second, that the government speci…es taxation policy to minimise the individual-speci…c e¤ect, " i : Third, suppose the government's objective is achieved on average such that E (" i ) = 0 for all i.
Under these conditions, any reranking that arises must also be identi…ed as horizontal inequity. Hence, if horizontal inequity is deemed to be undesirable, then it is reasonable to suppose that the same can be said for reranking, given the direct correspondence between the two concepts. 13 This conclusion, combined with the fact that precise pre-tax equals are seldom observed in survey data, explains why many applied studies of horizontal inequity focus upon reranking. However, this conclusion applies only to reranking that has no explicit equity justi…cation. Furthermore, in practice it is important to weigh the undesirable 1 2 Fei (1981) called this restriction 'incentive preservation', referring to the fact that an individual who is subject to a marginal tax rate in excess of 100 per cent has an incentive to reduce pre-tax income.
1 3 See Musgrave (1990) for a brief survey of the relationship between alternative concepts of redistributive justice and horizontal equity. The concept of horizontal equity is not universally accepted. Gordon (1972) suggested that the initial ordinal ranking of individuals merits no normative emphasis. Also, horizontal equity may not be satis…ed by the solution that maximises a utilitarian social welfare function (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) . 1 4 See the de…nitions of horizontal equity suggested by Feldstein (1976, p.83), and Plotnick (1985, p.241) . Jenkins (1988b, p.308) referred to the 'no-reranking' condition as 'strong horizontal equity', and the 'equal-treatment-of-equals' condition as 'weak horizontal equity '. implications of observed reranking against alternative issues of concern, such as those mentioned in the introduction.
Equivalence Scales and Reranking
In terms of observed incomes, equation (1) translates to:
where a ¤ de…nes the equivalence scale implicit in tax policy. To explore the sources of observed reranking, assume that the government's desired redistributive policy involves the linear function:
where the same marginal tax rate, t < 1, is applied to all income units irrespective of their characteristics, and there is a single transfer payment, G, which is adjusted according to the government's equivalence scale. Assuming that " i = 0
for all i, and substituting equation (4) into (2), gives:
Thus, for any two income units, A and B, for which xA < xB , reranking of unequivalised incomes arises if y B < y A , that is if:
This reranking is a deliberate ob jective of transfer policy in response to a value judgement regarding the 'needs' of the respective income units.
Suppose that an independent judge wishes to examine the redistributive e¤ects of the transfer system de…ned by equation (3) using an equivalence scalẽ a i instead of the government's implicit scale. Use ofã i implies that pre-tax and post-tax equivalent incomes are related (assuming " i = 0) by:
Hence, reranking may be observed unlessã i is distributionally equivalent to a ¤ i , such that a ¤ i =ã i is constant. Consider, for example, two income units, for which x A <x B . From equation (7), reranking is observed (ỹ B <ỹ A ) if:
that is, if the di¤erence between the post-tax bene…t derived from pre-tax equivalent income by the two income units is more than o¤set by the di¤erence between the equivalent transfer bene…ts that arises due to the equivalence scale used.
A Nonlinear Tax Function
Consider the implications for reranking of assuming an equivalence scaleã i , when the net e¤ect of taxes and bene…ts is described by the generalised speci…cation of equation (1):ỹ
Assume that the government's implicit scale and the scale adopted for analysis are related by:
Substituting into equation (9) gives:
Suppose that the equivalised tax function can be described by an N th order polynomial (through a Taylor's series expansion), so that:
where¯j (j = 0; :::; N ) are tax function coe¢cients. Equation (12) can be used to explore the e¤ects of variations in an equivalence scale that approximates a ¤ i .
For the jth term of the tax function:
where the approximations assume small¸i. Substituting for the tax function terms in equation (12):
where Ã i accounts for approximations made when deriving equation (13).
To explore the implications for reranking, consider the two income units referred to above, for whichx A <x B . From (14), reranking (ỹ B <ỹ A ) is observed if:
This result suggests the following conclusions regarding the sources of reranking.
The disparity between the pre-tax equivalent incomes of income units A and B tends to oppose the inequality condition required for reranking: as the units move further apart in the pre-tax distribution ceteris paribus, it is less likely that reranking will be observed.
The deduction made by the equivalent tax function for increases in pretax equivalent income tends to support the inequality condition required for reranking: the more severely the equivalent tax function treats income unit B relative to A ceteris paribus, the more it is likely that reranking will be observed.
Assuming that¸i > ¡ã i for all i, the larger is " B relative to " A ceteris paribus, the more it is likely that reranking will be observed. This observation, which relates to the relative severity of tax treatment for the two income units, is consistent with the preceding paragraph.
The in ‡uence on reranking of the relation between the equivalence scale adopted for analysis,ã i , and the equivalence scale implicit in the transfer system, a ¤ i , depends upon elements of the equivalent tax function. When
,¸A tends to support, whilȩ B tends to oppose, the inequality condition required for reranking: the smaller isã A relative to a ¤ A , and the larger isã B relative to a ¤ B , ceteris paribus, the more likely reranking is to be observed. When ¡ i < 0 for i = (A; B),¸A tends to oppose, and¸B tends to support the inequality condition required for reranking.
When ¡ i = 0 for i = (A; B),¸A and¸B have no e¤ect on the likelihood that reranking will be observed, ceteris paribus.
Observed reranking is therefore attributable to three principal factors, in addition to the distribution of pre-tax income. These are: the structural speci…cation of the transfer system as described by T (x ¤ ) in equation (11); the heteroscedastic application of the transfer system as described by " and; the disparity,¸; between the equivalence scale used for analysis and the scale implicit in transfer policy. Furthermore, if the equivalence scale adopted is distributionally equivalent to the scale implicit in the transfer system (a ¤ i = cã i implies¸i=ã i = (c ¡ 1) for all i), (11) and (15) indicate that observed reranking can arise only from the structural speci…cation of the transfer system and/or its heteroscedastic application, neither of which has an equity justi…cation.
Reranking and Implicit Equivalence Scales
This section considers whether observed reranking is minimised by the equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy. The discussion is concerned with summary measures of reranking and while no reference is made to any particular index, discussion focuses on two properties of reranking, incidence and intensity. The …rst property refers to the frequency of observed reranking in a population, discussed in Section 3. The second property takes into consideration the fact that more concern may be associated with reranking when deviations between the pre-tax and post-tax distributions are large.
Minimising Observed Reranking
To consider whether reranking is minimised by the equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy, begin by focusing upon two income units, A and B, subject to scalesã A andã B respectively. For any combination of strictly positive pretax and post-tax incomes, it is always possible to specify the equivalence scale, a A =ã B , such that reranking will not be observed between the respective income units. Where, for example, x A > x B and y A < y B , selectingã A =ã B > x A =x B orã A =ã B < y A =y B gives equivalised incomes:
which maintain pre-tax ranks in the post-tax distribution. This conclusion is independent of the relativities implicit in transfer policy, or the existence of horizontal inequity. Hence, for a population of two income units, it is possible that reranking is minimised by a range of equivalence scales that may bear little relation to the relativities implicit in transfer policy.
It may be thought that this conclusion is relevant only for small populations.
However, it can be shown to apply more generally. Consider a large population comprised of two subgroups, 1 and 2, within each of which income units are considered to be homogenous, and hence subject to the same equivalence scale.
Altering the equivalence scale thus has no a¤ect on the incidence of reranking within subgroups, but a¤ects reranking between groups.
The impact of equivalence scales on reranking for this population can be explored using Figure 1 6 In practice, it is likely that the equivalence scale used di¤erentiates between many more than two population subgroups. Furthermore, incomes within any given subgroup are unlikely to be bound within the type of range displayed in Figure 1 . However, it is reasonable to interpret the …gures as di¤erentiating between one population subgroup and all others. Also, the income bounds de…ned in Figure 1 may be thought of as de…ning the range where the density of the respective population subgroups is highest. First, between groups reranking may be a¤ected, as is the case for the comparison between A and B when moving from Panel A to B. In the extreme case, where the ranges of pre-tax and post-tax income of each subgroup do not overlap, no reranking is observed between income units of the di¤erent subgroups.
This e¤ect bears obvious similarities with the two-income-unit case examined earlier.
Secondly, the intensity of reranking relative to mean population income is diminished in subgroups that are subject to larger equivalence scales, as is observed for the reranking between units B and C when moving from Panel A to B. Depending on the populations considered, these e¤ects may evidently reduce reranking even if the scale considered is quite di¤erent from the relativities implicit in transfer policy. This statement can be made clear by the following example. Suppose the income units of subgroup 1 are subject to horizontally equitable tax burdens (so that no reranking is observed within the subgroup), but those of subgroup 2 involve some horizontal inequity. In this case, reranking of equivalised incomes can be minimised by applying an in…nite equivalence scale to subgroup 2, which would omit reranking between the subgroups (since x ¡ 1 > 0) and minimise the intensity of any reranking observed within subgroup 2 (relative to average population income).
In Section 1 it was suggested that identifying the equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy by minimising observed reranking could be useful because it does not rely on the assumption of a particular tax function for reference households. The analysis presented here reveals that omitting comparisons with the reference unit tax function can lead to a signi…cant di¤erence between the equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy and the scale that minimises observed reranking. It is possible, for example, for reranking to be minimised by a scale that shifts a subgroup of the population to a point in the equivalised income distribution that is otherwise scarcely populated, and also distorts the equivalised tax burden of the subgroup relative to the remaining population.
In short, the equivalence scale that minimises reranking can trade decreased reranking for increased horizontal inequity (as horizontal inequity is de…ned by Muellbauer and van de Ven, 2003) .
The equivalence scale that minimises the incidence of reranking does not therefore necessarily coincide with the scale that is implicit in transfer policy.
However, it may be suggested that in practice -when incomes are dense and there is su¢cient overlapping between groups -the two scales will be related.
Indeed, it may be conjectured that the equivalence scale which minimises the incidence of reranking, while not necessarily equal to the closest approximation to the one that is implicit in transfer policy, will nevertheless be its vicinity. The above analysis suggests that this depends on the joint distributions of income and subgroup characteristics. This is examined in the following section.
Analysis of Survey Data
This section uses survey data to consider the relationship between equivalence scales and the reranking e¤ects of taxation. A brief description of the data is given before presenting the empirical results.
The Data
The data were derived from the Con…dentialised Unit Record Files (CURFs) of Both surveys attempt to account for all direct pecuniary ‡ows. For the analysis undertaken here, no attempt is made to impute indirect taxes. The income unit adopted for analysis is the nuclear family, which comprises a single adult or married (registered or de facto) couple and any dependant children under the age of 17 years. After deleting income units with inconsistent data, negative income gross of taxes and bene…ts, or non-positive income net of taxes and bene…ts, the FES and SIHC were reduced, respectively, to 6,803 and 8,451 households.
Empirical Results
Measures of household income were adjusted for family size and composition using:
where c i and w i refer respectively to the number of children and adults in income unit i, and 0 · (µ; ©) · 1. The coe¢cient µ determines the economies of scale implied by the equivalence scale, and © indicates the e¤ect of children relative to adults. The equivalence scale described by (17) is de…ned with reference to single adults with no dependant children, for whom a i = 1 regardless of the parameter values adopted. The speci…cation assumes that the parameters µ and © are independent of income. 18 When calculating summary measures of reranking, measures of equivalent income were weighted by the number of individuals in each household.
The analysis presented here focuses upon the Atkinson (1979 )-Plotnick (1981 summary measure of reranking, R. 
where;
The variables x and y denote pre-tax and post-tax income respectively, F (:) is the respective cumulative distribution function, cov(:) is the covariance operator, and ¹ y is the arithmetic mean of y. When the ordering of individuals by post-tax income is the same as the ordering by pre-tax income, F (y) = F (x), G y = C y , and R = 0.
1 8 This formulation was used by, for example, Cutler and Katz (1992) , Banks and Johnson (1994) , Jenkins and Cowell (1994) , and Citro and Michael (1995) . Furthermore, Buhmann et al. (1988) show, using a simpli…cation where children are given the same weight as adults, that adjusting µ provides an approximation to a wide range of equivalence scales.
1 9 For alternative summary indices of reranking see, for example, King (1983 ), Cowell (1985 , and Jenkins (1988b) .
The reranking measure, R, incorporates the same aggregation that is associated with the Gini coe¢cient. To explore di¤erent value judgements associated with the aggregation, the analysis has been repeated using the extended Gini coe¢cient. Since similar results are obtained for all of the measures considered, the discussion presented below focuses upon the Atkinson-Plotnick statistic, and results for alternative statistics are presented in Appendix A.
To obtain a detailed picture of the e¤ect on reranking of using di¤erent values of µ and ©, the unit square including all combinations of µ and © was divided The reranking minimising scale parameters may be compared with econometric estimates of the scale implicit in transfer policy, based on the use of an explicit tax function following Muellbauer and van de Ven (2003) . For Australia, a quadratic polynomial equivalent tax function and a logarithmic speci…cation for tax function heteroscedasticity were used as follows:
For the UK, a third-order polynomial with homoscedastic errors was found to provide a better …t for the tax function. The estimates are displayed in Table   1 . It can be seen that the equivalence scale parameters that minimise R=V displayed in Figures 2 to 5 are in the vicinity of the estimates in Table 1, although 2 2 However, the results considered here correct for the e¤ect of the equivalence scale relativities on inequality per se. Furthermore, unlike the pro…les of inequality and poverty reported by Banks and Johnson (1994) , the pro…les of reranking displayed in Figures 2 to 5 exhibit a global minimum with © > 0.
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2 3 The estimation method involves searching for parameter values that minimise deviations from horizontal equity. Given a close association between reranking and horizontal inequity, it is likely that the values also minimise observed reranking. the di¤erences are statistically signi…cant. However, the measures of R=V associated with the regression estimates are within the 95 per cent con…dence interval about the global minimum observed for R=V using both Australian and UK data. For Australia, the R=V measure calculated at the parameter estimates in Table 1 is equal to 5.728, and for the UK the respective R=V measure is equal to 7.520. These compare with a minimum R=V of 5.677 with a 95 per cent con…dence interval of 5.340-6.039 for Australia, and a minimum of 7.304 with a 95 per cent con…dence interval of 6.945-7.719 for the UK. 24 These results suggest that the reranking-minimising equivalence scales may provide a conservative basis for scales implicitly used by policy makers. Nolan are attributable to the speci…c relativities of the scale that he imposed, rather than a conclusion that holds more generally.
The parameters that minimise R=V imply larger economies of scale (a smaller value for µ) and a larger adjustment for children relative to adults (a larger value of ©) compared with the associated regression estimates for both countries. This …nding can be explained with reference to the analysis in Sections 3 and 4. The survey populations considered in Figures 2 to 5 can be divided into three groups; income units for which a larger equivalence scale is associated with the parameter estimates derived using the two-stage regression displayed in Table 1 (households comprised predominantly of adults), income units for which a larger equivalence scale is associated with the parameter values that minimise the incidence of reranking (households with children), and income units for which the equivalence scale is una¤ected by the parameters adopted (reference households).
Australian and UK data reveal that the average pre-tax equivalent income (adjusted by the scales associated with the regression estimates) of income units in the …rst of these three groups is greater than the average pre-tax equivalent income in the second group ($24,648 compared with $10,261 for Australia, and £ 269.04 compared with £78.36 for the UK). Thus, raising equivalence scales above those from regression estimates for a subgroup of income units that have, on average, low pre-tax equivalent incomes tends to reduce the R=V observed, and vice versa for a subgroup of income units with high pre-tax equivalent incomes.
Consider two representative individuals drawn from the …rst and second population subgroups referred to above, and denote them A and B respectively.
Let a ¤ denote the equivalence scale de…ned by the parameter estimates in Table   1 , and assume that the respective pre-tax incomes of A and B are such that
Suppose that the equivalence scale used for analysis isã, whereã A > a
The pre-tax equivalent incomes of A and B exhibit greater disparity based on the equivalence scaleã than on a ¤ . This suggests it is less likely that reranking is observed between A and B. Indeed, assuming that the marginal rate of the equivalent tax function is strictly less than one, the left hand side of equation (15) opposes the inequality condition required for reranking. This is o¤set by uncertainty regarding the e¤ect on the right hand side of equation (15), which depends upon the equivalent tax function parameters and the heteroscedastic application of taxation in addition to the alteration considered for the equivalence scale. Assuming the same equivalence scale is applicable for pre-tax and post-tax income,ỹ A < y ¤ A andỹ B > y ¤ B , which supports the conclusion that it is less likely that reranking between A and B is observed using equivalence scaleã than a ¤ . These e¤ects are consistent with the discussion in Section 4 regarding Figure 1 , where the relative increase considered for the equivalence scale of subgroup 2 resulted in the omission of observed reranking between income units A and B and a reduced area in which reranking between subgroups could occur.
Conclusions
Reranking can have a signi…cant e¤ect on the progressivity achieved by a taxtransfer system, and is closely related to concepts of equity and redistributive justice. However, empirical analyses of reranking are typically subject to criticism on the basis of the value judgements that they exogenously impose. This paper examined the implications for reranking of di¤erent value judgements regarding the needs of heterogeneous income units. It was conjectured that an appropriate estimation strategy for the equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy is to seek the relativities that minimise reranking. This strategy does not require an assumed speci…cation for the tax function of reference units. Analytical results showed that the equivalence scale that minimises observed reranking can di¤er from the scale that is implicit in transfer policy. Nevertheless, analysis of survey data from Australia and the UK revealed no signi…cant di¤erence between the minimum measure of reranking, and the reranking observed for regression-based scales that minimise horizontal inequity using an explicit tax function. Hence, the reranking-minimising equivalence scales may provide a conservative basis for scales implicitly used by policy makers.
The analysis presented here consequently provides the analyst with a framework for selecting the parameters of a given equivalence scale speci…cation. It does not, however, provide an adequate response to criticism that observed reranking may be due to horizontal inequity 'imposed from the outside'; selection of an equivalence scale speci…cation can have an important e¤ect on the measures of reranking obtained. Clearly, the practitioner must continue to exercise care when selecting an equivalence scale, and when interpreting associated distributional observations. 
